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A woman said, "Everything burns down and we are left with nothing. How little our lives are made (of). How alone we are, so far away from everything." In Baliguda, in one church, furniture was dragged out, lit into a grotesque sculpture. The private violated in public, made spectacle. A Catholic church burnt, opposite the street the fire station witnessed the incident, but did not intervene. A cow, dragged from a shed, set afire, was beaten to death, identified as "Christian." Targeted:
Bammunigaon, Bodagan, Daringbari, Goborkutty, Jhinjirguda, Kamapada,
Kulpakia, Mandipanka, Nuagaon, Phulbani, Pobingia, Sindrigaon, Ulipadaro
villages. Convents, presbytery, hostels, a minor seminary, vocational
training centre. Organisational offices, as that of World Vision. Two
churches in Chakapad. Christian
religious services were not permitted in Phulbani. A Hindutva mob
surrounded Tikabali police station, two jeeps were torched.
Independent investigators charge that the violence was planned,
that the police had prior knowledge of Hindutva groups' intent to riot.
The pertinent district collector and superintendent of police have been
transferred, not discharged. A Judicial Review Commission (JRC) chaired
by a former (not sitting) judge has been appointed by the government of
Orissa to investigate the riots. Its power or legitimacy is in question.
The Central government did not appoint an inquiry by the Central Bureau
of Investigation, even as it is apparent that the very administration
that failed to contain the riots and delayed deploying adequate forces,
and whose officials at the district level may have been involved in its
execution, cannot administer justice. Hindutva
activists have lobbied the JRC to organize its terms of reference
premised on the claim that an attack on Lakshmanananda Saraswati, a
Hindu proselytiser, by Christians in Bammunigaon started the riots. This
timeline is falsified. Sources state Hindutva groups planned Christmas
day strikes, organised vandalism of Christmas symbols, and incited
rioting. Christians in one area responded with reciprocal, not
proportionate, violence. Dominant rationale reduces this to majority vs
minority communalism. Rather than focus on systematic targeting of
Christians, their overwhelmingly peaceful submission to Hindutva's
violence, and vast structural injustices and differences in relations of
power between majority and minority, the scrutiny appears to be focused
on the failure of all Christian groups to simply submit to dominance. The
Kandhamal riots were not unexpected. Saraswati has been overseeing
Hinduisation there since 1969. Adivasis, Dalits, Christians, Muslims are
targeted through social and economic boycotts, forced conversions to
Hinduism, and other violence. The Orissa Prevention of Cow Slaughter
Act, 1960, deployed against Muslims; Orissa Freedom of Religion Act,
1967, against Christians. In 1999, Mayurbhanj Catholic priest Arul Das
was murdered, followed by destruction of Kandhamal churches. In 2004,
Raikia Catholic Church was vandalized, eight Christian homes burnt. In
2005, converting 200 Adivasi Christians to Hinduism in Malkangiri,
Saraswati stated, "How will we ... make India a completely Hindu
country? This is our aim and this is what we want to do." In 2006,
celebrating RSS architect Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar's centenary,
presided by Saraswati, seven yagnas (sacrifices) were held, culminating
at Chakapad in Kandhamal, attended by 30,000 Adivasis.
Between July-December 2007, Hindutva rallies across Kandhamal
raised anti-Christian sentiments. Hindutva
leaders rumor, "Phulbani-Kandhamal is a most important Christian
area in Orissa with rampant and forced conversions." The Christian
population in Kandhamal district is 117,950, Hindus number 527,757.
Sangh leaders claim, "By VHP data there are 927 churches in
Phulbani district built on illegally taken land." Church leaders
respond there are 521 churches. Orissa Christians number 897,861, 2.4
percent of the state's population. Constitutionally authorized, the
Hindu Right inflates conversions to Christianity. This circulates in
retaliatory capacity even among progressive communities, who fixate on
conversions as contributing to the communalization of society,
debilitating to the majority status of Hindus. Muslims are seen as
"infiltrating" from Bangladesh, looting livelihood
opportunities, dislocating the "Oriya/Indian nation," non-Hinduised
Adivasis and Dalits as "unruly." Hindutva
legitimates violence as patriotic response. The Sangh uses local
militarism (Kandhamal) as consort to state controlled militarization (Kashipur,
Kalinganagar). Hindu cultural dominance organizes Hindu nationalism.
Orissa amalgamated as a Hindu state between 1866 and1936. The absence of
structural reforms and assertion of Hindu elites define post-colonial
governance. The Sangh has proliferated into 10,000-14,000 villages,
operating 35-40 major organizations, with a massive base of a few
million. A Balasore district Shiv Sena unit formed the first Hindu
"suicide squad." The Hindu nationalist BJP-BJD coalition
yields power. The Hindu Suraksha Samiti organises against Muslims.
Revolting slogans, "Mussalman ka ek hi sthan, Pakistan ya kabristan
(For Muslims there is one place, Pakistan or the grave)," perforate
neighborhoods. In
Kandhamal, Hindu militant groups, neighbors, police, chief minister,
Central government acted with egregious impunity. People remain missing,
death counts inaccurate. The police refuse Christians seeking to file
first information reports. The Baliguda relief camp is skeletal. Despite
continuing tensions, police presence has abated.
Confidence building steps are absent. Relief, compensation,
reparation are incommensurate with the extent of social, psychological,
and economic losses of communities. Political parties, focused on
politicking the issue, fail to respond to immediate and long-term needs
of people. (Source: The Asian Age, 07 January 2008 by Angana Chatterji, an associate professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at California Institute of Integral Studies.) |
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